The decision came quickly—unexpectedly quickly.

Just 24 hours after the hearing, Italy’s Constitutional Court announced that it had rejected the constitutional challenge brought by the Turin Court against the so-called Tajani Citizenship Law, the reform that radically reshaped the system for recognizing Italian citizenship by descent.

According to the brief press release issued by the Court, the objections raised by the Turin judge were deemed partly “unfounded” and partly “inadmissible.”

The news came as a cold shower for those who had hoped the Court would halt the reform introduced by the Italian government. For many legal scholars, the Tajani law raises serious constitutional concerns, particularly because of its retroactive effects on individuals who, under the previous legal framework, were considered Italian citizens from birth.

During the March 11 hearing, the arguments challenging the constitutionality of the law were both robust and carefully developed. The case against the reform was articulated with significant technical depth. By contrast, according to several observers, the defense presented by the Italian State appeared considerably weaker.

That is precisely why the outcome surprised many.

Yet what drew even greater attention was the speed of the announcement. The Court’s press release was issued in record time—barely 24 hours after the hearing.

This inevitably raises questions: who was the message meant for?

Was it directed at the many individuals now excluded by the Tajani system—people who until recently were regarded as Italian citizens and who now seek to defend their rights in court?

Or perhaps at the judges who had begun questioning the law, signaling an institutional warning as further constitutional referrals emerge?

And there is another crucial point.

The press release is not the judgment itself.

What the Court released is merely an announcement of the outcome. It does not contain the legal reasoning behind the decision.

In other words, we know the ending of the first act, but not how the story arrived there.

The situation inevitably recalls a literary image from Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch: arriving at a theatre when the play has already begun and having to imagine what happened before.

Something similar is happening here. We know how the first scene ends, but the development of the narrative remains unknown.

This vacuum has produced an almost inevitable phenomenon: a proliferation of interpretations. Jurists, commentators and citizens alike are attempting to reconstruct the Court’s reasoning from just a few lines.

In this sense, what emerges is the “active reader” described by Cortázar—the one who attempts to fill the silences of a story that has not yet been fully told.

But the reality is simple: until the full judgment is published, no serious legal evaluation of its reasoning is possible.

What the Court Actually Decided

According to the official statement, the Constitutional Court held that:

• the objections based on Article 3 of the Italian Constitution—through which the Turin Court challenged the arbitrariness of distinguishing between those who applied for citizenship recognition before March 28, 2025, and those who applied afterward—were unfounded;

• the alleged violation of Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, concerning EU citizenship, was also deemed unfounded;

• the claims based on Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality, were declared inadmissible;

• and likewise inadmissible was the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to enter one’s own country.

The distinction is important.

When a constitutional challenge is declared unfounded, the Court examines the merits of the issue and concludes that no constitutional violation exists. When it is declared inadmissible, the Court does not examine the substance of the claim, typically for procedural reasons.

Even so, this decision does not close the legal debate.

A Procedural Detail That Changes the Landscape

One procedural aspect, largely overlooked, may prove decisive.

Many observers were surprised that the Constitutional Court chose to examine only the Turin referral, separating it from the constitutional challenge raised by the Mantua Court, which could technically have been addressed jointly.

This likely indicates that the Court considered the Turin case to possess sufficient technical autonomy to warrant independent treatment.

In practical terms, this has an important consequence: the other constitutional challenges are not automatically affected by the negative outcome of the Turin case.

The referrals from Mantua and Campobasso will be examined in subsequent stages, leaving the judicial landscape very much open.

The Judicial Process Continues

The legal battle over the Tajani law is therefore far from over.

On April 14, the Joint Chambers of the Italian Court of Cassation—the highest authority of the ordinary judiciary—will convene to address the interpretation of the law.

The Court of Cassation performs a fundamental role in the Italian legal system: ensuring the uniform interpretation of the law, a function known as nomofilachia.

When cases of exceptional importance arise, or when conflicting interpretations emerge among lower courts, the Court sits in Joint Chambers, giving its rulings greater authority.

Although its decisions are not formally binding in the same way as precedents in common-law systems, their interpretative authority is immense. In practice, they become what Italian jurists call “living law”—the consolidated interpretation that lower courts tend to follow and that the Constitutional Court itself frequently takes into account.

The Principle at Stake

At the heart of this debate lies a fundamental legal question: how Italian citizenship by descent should be understood.

For decades, Italian jurisprudence has consistently held that citizenship iure sanguinis is acquired automatically at birth.

It does not arise from an administrative act or from a judicial ruling. Judges do not grant citizenship; they merely recognize a right that already exists.

This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Court of Cassation, most notably in Joint Chambers decision No. 4466/2009, and later confirmed by rulings such as 25318/2022 and 29459/2019.

According to this settled jurisprudence, judicial recognition of citizenship is declaratory, not constitutive: the status of citizen exists from birth.

And it is precisely this principle that now stands at the center of the debate. Those born before the Tajani law cannot lose citizenship simply because they failed to submit an application before an arbitrary date that had never previously been announced.

A Long Process Just Beginning

The so-called “Italian Citizenship Spring of 2026” has begun with an unexpected twist.

Yet the judicial landscape remains far from settled. The forthcoming decisions of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court will be decisive.

The legal battle has only just begun.

And although the sky may appear overcast today, the great controversies of law eventually find their light.

Pablo Munini
Attorney-at-Law
Bar Association Registration: Vol. 55, Folio 386
Public Bar Association of Buenos Aires